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Value and Economic Cultures
among the Peasant Gold Miners of the Cuyo Cuyo District (Northern
Puno, Peru)
Chapter 6 - Footnotes 1Records from Carabaya's Cajas Reales, covering the period from 1684 through 1775, were consulted in the Archivo General de la Nación Lima (Cajas Reales, cuadernos 1-257). I found one reference to a mine called San Sebasti n de Ancoccala in the Poto District; it was leased by the Spanish Crown to a Spaniard. There were no indications of indigenous property, however. (AGN, Lima Cajas Reales, Legajo 15, Cuaderno 53 29/10/1720.) 2Huancantira is an area located approximately 3 kilometers northeast of Ancoccala; it is currently abandoned due to its low yield. 3I heard contradictory explanations concerning the services performed by elderly people. Some told me that the elderly undertake these tasks as a favor, knowing that the person who receives the aid will return it either in food, protection, or help in the elders' own fields. I was also told, however, that there are fixed fees for the care of houses or of houses with guinea pigs (which demand more labor). I do not know the exact amounts charged. 4The market in Oriental is under the political jurisdiction of Ancoccala which levies a tax on the sellers who come from the Huancané Province every week. This market is located on a main road and was formed during the economic renaissance of Ancoccala following the increase in gold prices in 1972. 5Despite this rule, one of the largest and best sluiceways of the mine was used by a comunero from Ura Ayllu. "He has the right to be here," said a miner from Ancoccala, "because he has served the mine as President and in other positions." Outsiders' claims are less secure, however. Two miners who were comuneros from the neighboring community of Chuquini were expelled from Ancoccala in 1986 as a result of increasing pressure on the resources of the mine. 6Although I do not have clear evidence, it is likely that the permanent residents of Ancoccala are the herders who worked on the mistis' properties, which were returned to Puna Ayllu community by the Agrarian Reform in the early 1970s (see Chapter 2). 7Dual organization of irrigation canals in Quinua, Ayacucho, is related to the division of the community into upper and lower segments (Mitchell 1976). 8The number of hours varies depending on the number of qhallana (water rations) that each sector has. 9Households pool their water in collective reservoirs to improve both the physical efficiency of water transportation and the social and economic efficacy of its distribution. Since every nuclear family receives only one qhallana of water, its slow movement along a narrow canal to be stored in an individual reservoir implies heavy percolation and evaporation losses, and a considerable investment of time to oversee its transportation. Conversely, pooling qhallana reduces losses and decreases the amount of time spent overseeing the transportation of water, since the task is undertaken on a rotational basis by members of the user's group. After the reservoirs are filled, each household transports its own share to smaller household-owned ponds (qochas) or directly to their sluiceways at flow rates that are higher than one qhallana. 10Lambert's description of family coalitions ("kindred" groups) among puna herders resembles closely the coalitions which are structured around water tanks in the Ancoccala mine (1980: 12-15) 11Contradicting this assertion is the fact that land deeds for the period 1930-1950 indicate that some Puna Ayllino households controlled as many as seven caños and several water tanks. It is possible that community control has tightened with the increasing pressure on water. 12Discussing caño inheritance, a young comunero with several young sons explained to me that in order to facilitate his children's future access to sluiceways, he planned to request a new caño from the authorities even though his current caño yet had years of productive life. This move would let him reduce the exploitation of his current caño. It was clear to him that this concession would require the investment of time, gifts, and influence. The management of caños in Ancoccala resembles traditional Andean forms of communal control of agricultural and grazing lands (Mayer 1985). 13Two miners estimated the total number of peons working in Ancoccala to be around 30. 14I never heard of ritual prohibitions affecting the presence of women in the sluiceway. Such taboos are widespread in underground mining in the Andes (Nash 1979) 15Ancoccala is located in the zone that has the best deposits in the region, second only to Pampa Blanca in the vicinity of the town of Ananea (INGEMET-ORSTOM 1950, 2: 54-57). Puna Ayllu's southernmost border coincides with the geological limits of the best gold deposits, certainly not a coincidence. This suggests that community control over these pasture lands has the mineral deposits as its main objective. 16The miners are currently working on a new canal that will be longer than the present one. 17Family "R" (No. 26) in Table 1.1. 18The fourteen-year-old boy who was participating in this waritachy received candy instead of coca. 19In Quinua, Ayacucho, several llaqta varayoq are in charge of the distribution of water at each of the two main canals. They also are called "owners" of the irrigation system (Mitchell 1976: 35). 20Miners in Ancoccala must invest considerable time to secure their water provision. They must, for instance, police water distribution during their shift, visit authorities, neighbors, and relatives to deal with water distribution issues, and guard their water reservoirs at night. Except for those who receive their water allocation during the night, most miners devote part of the day to bringing water from the main canals to collective reservoirs and finally to their own qochas. When water is in short supply in the system, some miners who receive water during the day must guard their personal reservoirs at night to prevent water theft. 21This role is exactly the same that assigned the Lieutenant Governor in the mother community of Puna Ayllu (Chapter 3). 22This resembles the mechanisms of land appropriation, described in Chapter 4 in connection with the redistribution of communal lands. |